Indiana Appeals

Court of Appeals Finds, Absent a Written Agreement by the Parties, Trial Courts have no Discretion to Grant a Jury Trial after the Time for Such Demand has Elapsed

In Daugherty v. Robinson Farms, Inc., the Court of Appeals resolved the apparent conflict between Trial Rules 6(B) and 38(D).  Although Trial Rule 6(B) seems to allow the Court, at its discretion, to allow a belated demand for a jury trial, the more specific rule, 38(D), allows for such untimely demand only upon written consent of the parties. As such, without a written agreement agreeing to a jury trial, a trial court is without discretion to grant an untimely jury demand. 

Court of Appeals Holds no Hearing Necessary Prior to Issuing Default Judgment as Sanction for Failing to Comply with Discovery Order

In Mallard's Pointe Condominium Assoc, Inc. v. L & L Investors Group, LLC, the Court of Appeals determined that a trial court need not hold a hearing prior to entering in default judgment as a sanction for failing to comply with a Court Discovery Order. 

As Trial Rule 37 is silent as to whether a hearing is required before a court may sanction by default judgment, the court turned to case law.  The court examined previous Indiana case law finding that Trial Rule 55 governed the procedure for entering default judgments as a discovery sanction but determined that under the present form of Trial Rule 37 a court may enter default judgment with a finding that the remedy is "just." 

Indiana Court of Appeals Finds Interest Allowable on Delinquent Marital Dissolution Payments

In Zoller v. Zoller, the Indiana Court of Appeals once again found that when the property in a marital estate is divided, the amount one spouse is ordered to pay the other is a money judgment.  Money judgments, including sums ordered to be paid in a dissolution decree, accrue interest from the date the judgment becomes presently due.  When the sum ordered to be paid from one spouse to the other in a dissolution decree is immediately payable, the judgment accrues interest from the date the judgment is entered; regardless of whether the Court has included interest in its order.

Trial Courts may Consider Entirety of Pages Designated in Summary Judgment Proceedings

In Flip v. Block, the Court held that when a party moving for Summary Judgment designates a page of a deposition (or other evidentiary means) but only uses a portion of that page in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, the Court may, nevertheless, consider the entire page.  The trial court is not bound to considering only the specific sentences cited by the party in the Memorandum.  As such, Plaintiffs who failed to file a timely response or designation of materials to Defendants' Summary Judgment motion were permitted to ask the court to consider all pages designated by Defendants to prove the existence of a material issue of fact.   

Indiana Supreme Court Defends Modified Impact Rule

In Atlantic Coast Airlines v. Cook, the Indiana Supreme Court defended and reaffirmed Indiana's modified impact rule in claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The Court held, "[i]t our view that the requirements under Indiana’s rule are modest and that a less restrictive rule would raise the potential for a flood of trivial suits, pose the possibility of fraudulent claims that are difficult for judges and juries to detect, and result in unlimited and unpredictable liability. We therefore reaffirm that Indiana’s impact rule continues to require a plaintiff to demonstrate a direct physical impact resulting from the negligence of another."

The Court found that inhaling the cigarette smoke of another and feeling the vibrations of another's stomping feet were not sufficient impact to sustain a claim. 

The Court also upheld its "bystander rule" under which, where the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may nevertheless establish negligent infliction of emotional distress by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling caused by defendant's negligent or otherwise tortious conduct.

No Private Right of Action for Medicaid Transportation Providers or Recipients

In E. Mitchell Roob, Jr. v. Jannis Fisher, the Court of Appeals found that no private right of action exists for transportation providers or recipients of Medicaid under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, reversing the judgment of the trial court and directing it to vacate the orders.  The lower court had found such a right and under that right held that the State's Medicaid transportation rates were inadequate under federal law, increasing mileage reimbursement rates from $1.25 per mile to $1.85 per mile.

Indiana Court of Appeals Holds Binding Arbitration Provision not Violative of Magnuson Moss or Indiana Lemon Law

In Walker v. Daimler Chrysler, Corp., the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the Federal Trade Commission's conclusion that the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act precludes binding arbitration.  The Court determined nothing in the MMWA's text or legislative history precluded binding arbitration and also found that there was no inherent conflict between arbitration and the MMWA's underlying purposes, as arbitration would adequately protect consumers.  In so holding, the Court aligned itself with the two federal appellate courts and five of six state supreme courts that have decided the issue.

The Court of Appeals also found that binding arbitration was not violative of Indiana's Lemon Law statute. 

Indiana Court of Appeals Holds Enhanced Pension Not Marital Property

In Granzow v. Granzow, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, inter alia, the trial court's holding that the husband's enhanced pension was not marital property.  On August 1, 2003, Mr. Granzow filed for dissolution of marriage.  On Feburary 25, 2004, Mr. Granzow reached his thirtieth year of employment, at which point he was entitled to an enhanced pension, valued at $371,566.  The trial court found that "[T]he enhancement portion of the pension is not a marital asset subject to division.  The enhancement was not a vested entitledment when the parties separated in the spring of 2003.  The enhancement was not a vested entitlement when their divorce case was filed on August 1, 2003, nor was it vested entitlement when the parties were divorced on February 4, 2004.  The vesting did not occur until February 25, 2004, when [Husband] attained thirty (30) years of service with United States Steel."  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Indiana Court of Appeals Denies Interest to Employee for Late Workers Compensation Payments

In Bowles v. Griffin Industries, the Court of Appeals upheld the Workers Compensation Board of Indiana's ruling that an injured employee is not entitled to pre-judgment interest on temporary and total disability benefits that were allegedly paid late.  The Court stressed that its ruling does not preclude the board or a court from awarding post judgment interest on late payments under particular facts.

Indiana Court of Appeals Absolves Good Faith Creditor.

In Porter County Dev. Corp. v. Citibank, the Court of Appeals held that when a creditor accepts payment for valuable consideration in good faith and without any knowledge of misappropriation, it is not liable to the victim of the misappropriation for repayment.  The facts showed that an employee of the Porter County Development Corporation misappropriated money from the corporation and placed them in his checking account.  The employee then made three payments to Citibank for personal credit cards from these funds.  Citibank was unaware of any wrongdoing at all relevant times.

In finding no liability on the part of the good faith creditor, the Court went against the established, but antiquated, precedent of Porter v. Roseman (Ind. 1905) and Peoples State Bank v. Kelly (Ind. Ct. App. 1922), applying modern case law from Rhode Island, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland and the Seventh Circuit.