Indiana Appeals

Where the Facts are Undisputed, A Question of Contributory Negligence Becomes a Question of Law

In Howard and Merry Funston v. School Town of Munster, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment in a contributory negligence case. Planitiff Howard Funston sustained personal injuries when he fell off the top row of portable bleachers the school had provided for his son's AAU basketball game. There was no back support for the top row where Funston was sitting, so the Defendant school argued Funston was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. While the court noted that contributory negligence is generally a question of fact and not an appropriate matter for summary judgment, the court explained further that when the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom, the question of contributory negligence becomes one of law. "It was an undisputed fact that Funston leaned backwards before ascertaining whether there was something to lean on, a fact easily visible and one that he had ample opportunity to observe." Thus, from this undisputed fact, the Supreme Court held that Funston's negligence contributed to his injuries as a matter of law.

If a parties motion is not ruled upon within a specified period of time the motion is deemed denied

In Travis D. Garrison v. Charles E. Metcalf the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that a motion to correct errors is deemed denied if not ruled upon within thirty (30) days.  However, a belated grant of such a motion may be permitted if the moving party files a timely notice of appeal after the date of deemed denial.  In this case the moving party never filed a notice of appeal, thus the Court held that the motion to correct errors was deemed denied. 

Settlement Agreement Must be in Writing Prior to Court Approval

In In re Akers, the Indiana Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's adoption of a settlement agreement between the parties that the wife repudiated before the agreement was in writing. The court reversed the trial court's decision to adopt the alleged settlement agreement modifying child custody and support on the grounds that Indiana Code § 31-15-2-17 requires a settlement agreement to be in writing and approved by the court in order to be effective. Under this statute, the court noted that "until the parties' agreement is memorialized either in writing or on the trial court record, there is nothing for the trial court to approve, and either party is free to repudiate the alleged agreement."

Third Party Beneficiaries to Insurance Contract May Sue to Enforce Contract But Not Sue In Tort For Failure To Deal In Good Faith

In Claudette Cain v. Roger Griffin the Indiana Supreme Court held that a third party beneficiary to an insurance contract may sue the insurer to enforce the contract, however, they may not sue the insurer in tort for failure to deal in good faith because the relationship was not intentionally created by a close fiduciary or potentially adversarial contract and is thus not the "special relationship" that is required. 

This case involved a plaintiff that slipped and fell outside of the insured's restaurant.  When no immediate payment was made on her claim she sued.  The Supreme Court held that she could sue as a third party beneficiary to enforce the contract but not in tort for failure to deal in Good Faith. 

Journey's Account Statute Saves Plaintiff's Otherwise Time-barred Negligence Action

In Basham and Kentucky Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v. Penick, the Indiana Court of Appeals relied on Indiana's Journey's Account Statute to allow a plaintiff who initially filed suit in the wrong forum to advance his personal injury claim despite exceeding the two-year limitation period. The Journey's Account Statute allowed the plaintiff to bring a new action in the proper forum (Indiana) within three years after filing suit in the improper forum (Kentucky). In allowing the plaintiff's action to be brought, the court explained that the "purpose of the Journey's Account Statute is to preserve the right of a diligent suitor to pursue a judgment on the merits."

When Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction Exist A Court's Decision May Be Set Aside For Legal Error Through Direct Appeal Not Collateral Attack

In K.S. v. State of Indiana the Supreme Court held that when personal and subject matter jurisdiction exist a court's decision may be set aside for legal error only through direct appeal, and not through a collateral attack.  Subject Matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction involving the type of case involved, whereas personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction based on the appropriate process being effectuated on the parties.  The Court further suggests ceasing to use terms such as "jurisdiction over a particular case" because terms like these confuse actual jurisdiction with legal error. 

Standard of Proof for Determining Paternity in Worker's Compensation Claim Looks to Paternity Statutes, Not Wrongful Death Statutes

In First Student, Inc. and Byrd v. Estate of Meece, the issue before the Indiana Court of Appeals was whether an unborn child of the decedent qualified as a "dependent child", and was thus eligible to claim damages under Indiana's wrongful death statutes. In this case, paternity needed to be established before the child could be found "dependent." The court held that the standard of proof for the factual determination of paternity in a worker's compensation claim is effectively the same as used under the state's paternity statutes. Relying on the Indiana Supreme Court's explanation in Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. 1970), the court noted that for paternity to be established, a judicial proceeding must take place, and the mother's testimony must be corroborated by other evidence or circumstances suggesting a probabilty of paternity.

Police not immune for injuries incurred from negligent operation of vehicle while pursuing a fleeing suspect

In City of Indianapolis and Indianapolis Police Department v. Richard Garman the Indiana Supreme Court decided in accord with Patrick v. Miresso that police officers are not immune when the vehicle that they are driving while chasing a fleeing suspect hits and injures someone.  The Defendants claimed the that Tort Claims Act provided them with immunity, however, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision that police chases are not immune.